With today's global flows of information, conflict is no longer local even when it occurs in small islands far away from centres of world power. Communications technologies in the form of the Internet have allowed seemingly local events to be integrated into distantly managed networks that transform ideologies and agenda into real world outcomes wherever conditions are ripe for their implementation. As such, cyberspace—space constituted by the Internet—becomes a network of sites where groups in conflict extend their offline existence and power into localised confrontations that can entail violence.

Among the more powerful ways that cyberspace becomes divided into contested virtual and real spaces is through identity formation (Lim, 2002). As symbols, stylised messages, and news tailored to conform to religious and other identities coalesce around Web pages, mailing lists and decision-making organisations operating through the Internet, conflict is scaled down to local situations and then scaled back up into global causes. Confrontations generated in even the most remote locale feed into a global identity politics as evidence of conspiracy and threat to every member of the network, no matter where in the world they reside. More than just identity formation, the construction of identity frequently stylises itself as a “victim” in conflict with a dominant force and, further, even invents or borrows a meta-narrative that can justify and legalise all actions the group may take against a destructive hegemonic force.

Using the case of cyberspace in Indonesia in the context of Maluku conflict (see Box 1), the question addressed in this chapter is how a local setting in which Muslims and non-Muslims (mostly Christians) have co-existed for generations could change from ploughing the land in relative peace to engage in brutal attacks and mass killings in a very short space of time. While it can be shown that the roots of conflict have been in place for a long period of history, such observations do not tell why the conflict arose when it did or
how it has been fomented. This chapter offers a partial explanation by showing how identity formation has been purposefully manipulated in cyberspace to expand the sphere of anti-democratic and exclusionary movements into this local context.

**Box 1**

**Maluku in conflict**

Since early January 1999 at least 5,000 people (perhaps as many as 10,000) of both faiths (Christianity and Islam) have been killed and close to 7,000,000 became refugees in sectarian violence across the Maluku, a remote archipelago known as the Spice Islands during Dutch colonial times. Animosity between Christians and Muslims has been stoked by an influx of Muslims from other parts of the country.

Thousands of security personnel have been deployed to end the unrest in Maluku but have been unable, or unwilling, to do so. Both sides accuse the police and army of incompetence and join in fighting in the islands.

Street battles, rampaging mobs, arson and sniper attacks all have involved extremists of both faiths and government troops assigned to maintain peace allegedly have been either too afraid to intervene or have taken sides.

After more than three years, the situation now is calming down. Refugees are beginning to return to predominantly Muslim North Maluku (was separated from the old Maluku province in September 1998) but tensions remain high in Ambon and surrounding islands that are the core of the new Maluku province.

– Excerpts from ICG, 2002a

This chapter also shows how the meta-narratives that are created in cyberspace can compete against long existing meta-narrative. In the era of printed media, constructing a strong meta-narrative takes decades; however, in the age of the Internet where time can annihilate space, the creation of meta-narrative can be extremely fast. In the meta-narrative game, the Internet has an obvious revolutionary capacity to disseminate storylines and avoid state (or any other) regulation while placing no responsibility in practical terms for the violence it might exhort people to resort to, making it the ideal technology for meta-narratives to be played out in distant local arena. It thus also allows “remote” places like the Maluku to instantly be integrated into global storylines and, in reverse fashion, for the periphery to provide sites for struggles over the core.
Meta-narratives, legitimacy and domination

Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind (Orwell, 1954: 177).

With the post-World War II collapse of European empires and the emergence of independent nation-states, the peoples and governments of the de-colonised world have rewritten their own histories, taken over their own images and spoken in their own voices, including re-accentuating (neo-)colonialism and its perceived continuing injustices in the present. Indonesia is not an exception.

For societies in many modern nation-states, (re-)writing histories in an all-embracing and universal form is instrumental in creating national identities from what were, in many cases, colonial territories composed of disparate peoples and societies. Such a storyline told of from “a” perspective, which thus precludes other perspectives, constitutes a “meta-narrative”. For Lyotard (1983), a “meta-narrative” is a big story of mythic proportions that claims to account for, explain and subordinate all lesser, little, local narratives. Meta refers to overall, totalising. That is why Lyotard rejects the narrative that is assumed to be the ultimate universal narrative. Foucault (1972) associates the concept of meta-narrative with legitimacy as it can be used as a tool for social and political mobilisation against perceived antagonistic, hegemonic forces while it also seeks to create its own hegemony. In reconstructing the past by providing a fixed framework with shared identity and filling it with a single collective memory, a meta-narrative is very powerful in giving a sense of solidarity, to build faith in social and cultural unity and ethnic or national values—all of which are the basis for collective action. It is an intentional awakening to similarities and an assertion of homogeneity that is often intent on eradicating heterogeneity.

While a meta-narrative can be very useful and needed in maintaining the unity, harmony and solidarity of a nation-state, it mostly leads to inequality in power by tending to put those championed by the meta-narrative maker, often the state but also religious, racial or cultural associations, as the rightful holders of power to then dominate and marginalise others (Foucault, 1972).

In the case of Indonesia from the post-independence Sukarno to Suharto regimes, the state apparatus was consciously used for decades to create meta-narratives legitimising their power over civil society. People were fed these meta-narratives through the government’s, particularly the president’s, speeches, media propaganda and reading materials taught in schools and enforced by the Ministry of Information, police and social regulation. This has left Indonesia in a condition of pre-modern knowledge, namely, with knowledge largely based on narrative or story-like linear sequencing of events as told by the state without alternative sources of verification or critical thought. Narratives constitute knowledge by virtue of their function of transmitting sets of rules that constitute
social bonds, not by their correspondence with facts. Narratives are thus self-legitimating; they legitimate themselves through their function of social unity that reifies collective belief in them (Lyotard, 1983).

Suharto’s authoritarian regime was brought to an end in 1998 but the meta-narratives it and the Sukarno regime created are lasting longer in the people’s minds. At the same time, new and refurbished meta-narratives are being constructed by factions of society vying for control over others and, according to some meta-narratives, the state itself. Thus, while political reform has eroded the storyline of authoritarian regimes, it has also opened a new era in the construction and struggle over new ones.

Using the case of Maluku, the following sections shows how different type of historiographies by nationalist and religious groups have created different histories or meta-narratives that rest on selective remembering and selective forgetting. When one dominant power in the society—in this case the state—is changed or weakened in its level of power, such meta-narratives compete more boldly against each other. Some attack others and some strengthen the others. As the crescendo rises, what is left then is a polarisation of groups that forge their own ideology and truth based on their own meta-narrative, which ends up in continuing conflicts, some of which are violent and unrelentingly cumulative in generating violence and revenge in response.

Maluku in the nationalist meta-narrative

From the perspective of the separatist movements and other rebellions that are an intrinsic part of the general process of decolonisation, the movements that emerged in Southeast Asia in the wake of the Second World War sprang from a common historical experience, namely, the development of nationalist resistance to the (European) colonial powers, the definition of the respective national identities of the region, the upheaval of the period of Japanese intervention and the building process of independent states. In the history of establishing the Indonesian nation-state, there were many separatist movements. Among the most well-known ones is the RMS—Republik Maluku Selatan (Southern Maluku Republic)—separatist movement.

Indonesians outside of the Maluku, particularly those on Java, did not regard the Maluku as an important topics in daily conversations. In fact, most Indonesians, again particularly in Java, lack a deep knowledge about the Maluku. The following are five references that Indonesians commonly are familiar with regarding the existence of Maluku.

- Spices: These islands used to be the major producers of nutmeg, pepper and cinnamon—all related to the beginning of Portuguese colonisation in (East) Indonesia.
- Ternate and Tidore: These were two important kingdoms in East Indonesia that later were converted to Islam.
- Pattimura: Today, he is officially regarded as one of Indonesia’s liberation heroes.
- The RMS movement: This movement has been marked in all history books as a dark spot in the history of Republic of Indonesia.
- Ambonese (or native of Maluku): Many Ambonese are Christians and are famous for being able to sing well.

While the latter is known by the media exposure to Ambonese public figures, mainly the singers, the other four references are known mainly because they were the highlights the state marked in constructing the history of Indonesia.

Among the five, the RMS movement (or the proclamation of the South Maluku Republic, see Box 2) is seen as a big flaw of the Maluku. Without much consideration of the Maluku as a territory of the Dutch Indies with a different history of colonisation, the action of a group of Malukus led by some Dutch army veterans (KNIL) in proclaiming a separated nation-state from Indonesia has always been seen as an unforgivable act of disloyalty throughout post-colonial history.

**Box 2**

**Declaration of independence of the South Maluku**

“In order to comply with the positive will and demands of the people of the South Maluku, we hereby do proclaim the independence de facto and de jure of the South Maluku, with the political structure of a republic, without any political connection with the ‘Negara Indonesia Timur’ (i.e. Eastern Indonesia) and the ‘Republik Indonesia Serikat’ (i.e. Republic of the United States of Indonesia), on account of the fact that the ‘Negara Indonesia Timur’ (i.e. Eastern Indonesia) has proved unable to maintain either its position as a federal state in accordance with the Denpasar Regulations still in force or the decision of the Council of the South Maluku taken on 11 March 1947, whilst the ‘Republik Indonesia Serikat’ (i.e. Republic of the United States of Indonesia) is at present acting in violation of the Treaties made at the Round-Table Conference and its own Constitution.”

- Ambon, 25 April 1950 (Prins, 1959: 32–33)

The history itself is very much reconstructed by the state—the Sukarno and Suharto regimes—which indoctrinated the people particularly through the mass media (during Sukarno’s first years), the history books used for teaching in schools as well as specific history books published by other state institutions. By compiling some selected facts, repeating some particular stories and annihilating
other facts, both regimes had reconstructed the meta-narrative of Maluku as a renegade society, particularly the RMS, to maintain their positions in power by legitimising military control and suppression throughout the archipelago in the name of maintaining national unity.

Sukarno’s government did not publish many history books about the Maluku; however, it published some books regarding the RMS movement. For Sukarno’s regime, the issue of nationalism was paramount; thus, we can understand why the RMS movement was labelled as a very important anti-nationalist movement. In his speech on Independence Day, 17 August 1951, Sukarno rationalised the use of force against Maluka by emphasising that the bloody tragedy of Indonesia’s military attack against South Maluku occurred because the RMS did not welcome the peaceful efforts Indonesia initiated (Sukarno in Puar, 1956: 8–9). By blaming those whom he termed disloyal separatists, Sukarno tried to repel the voices of federalists who pointed out that the government’s effort in uniting Indonesia was more like a forced action rather than a strategic effort (Sunday Couriers, 1950).

Despite the not so supportive voice of the Sunday Couriers, other media coverage of RMS events in the 1950s was very much dominated by Sukarno’s jingoistic nationalism and, at the same time, tried to demonstrate the nation-state’s supremacy against the colonialist (Dutch) in order to gain people’s trust in the nation-state (see Box 3, see also Harian Limun, 1950 and Java Post, 1950).

Box 3

**Media coverage of an RMS incident**

... it is so real that the reactionary group of Dutch people was behind the screen; they led all chaos and turmoil in Indonesia ... (but) the government is (always) strong enough to handle all of these difficulties, is capable to defeat and fight against these anarchic elements. Thus we believe that in the South Maluku case, the government can also overcome them. (Tanah Air, 1950, translated from Indonesian).

Because it is so obvious that behind the Ambon movement there are some colonialist actors, ... (Pedoman, 1950, translated from Indonesian).

An action or deed which its purpose was to separate one of Indonesian areas ... no mercy for them, because this is a remarkable infidelity to the country and nation (Merdeka, 1950, translated from Indonesian).

The state under Sukarno also felt an urgent need to publish its perspective of the RMS, which materialised as a special book entitled Peristiwa Republik
Maluku Selatan (The Episode of the South Maluku Republic) published by the Department of Information. It clearly transcribed its obvious propaganda for militarism in Indonesia in passages such as that quoting the words of the Chair of Army’s Information Division, Imam Soekarto, in his introduction to the book:

The episode of the South Maluku Republic shows us again how hard and difficult the duty and responsible [sic] of our Army in fighting the rebellion in South of Maluku (Soekarno in Puar, 1956: 5, translated from Indonesian).

In this book, the RMS movement is portrayed as a national tragedy in the history of the Republic of Indonesia and as a lesson to justify that Indonesia as a nation-state will always face the threats and dangers of “foreign colonialists” that keep trying to invade the country (Puar, 1956: 3) or, more specifically in this case, “the labour of Dutch reactionary elements” (Puar, 1956: 49). By paralleling the RMS with the wickedness of colonialism, Sukarno attempted to build the spirit of nationalism in maintaining his power. There was no space given to the society to see the RMS movement as a reaction that originally came from Maluku people themselves without reliance on foreign intrigue.

At that moment, Sukarno was in a critical situation of cultivating the creation of Indonesian nation from the Dutch administrative territorial framework. While the majority of inhabitants of the Indies were Muslims and the languages and laws (adat) of these regions shared many general characteristics, along with Malay language that had gradually been accepted as the general language of commercial intercourse between the islands and of religious communication (Cribb, 1992: 200), it is very clear that there was no common sense of identity or of unifying historical memory throughout the Dutch-controlled Indies (Christie, 1996). None of the pre-colonial states had exercised authority over anything more than a fraction of the region. Even though Islam was dominant—which is not the case of Maluku—there were some substantial differences in the interpretations of Islam and localised acculturations that had taken root in the different areas of the vast colony. Meanwhile, although there was some resistance to the Dutch authority throughout the Indies, these revolts—Pattimura in Saporua Maluku (1817), Diponegoro in Central Java (1825–1830), the Banten revolt (1888), Tuanku Imam Bonjol in Minahasa (1821–1837) or any other revolts in other places—can only retrospectively be described as manifestation of Indonesian nationalism (Carey, 1981; Kartodirjo, 1966). These local struggles, in fact, basically were domestic resistance movements defending the rights of local states and the indigenous religion, not pan-nationalist movements per se. The meta-narrative of Sukarno wires these pieces together to create the myth of nationalism in order to justify his policy of “konfrontasi” or confrontation with all other nearby states and so-called separatist movements inhibiting the building and territorial expansion of the Indonesian nation-state.
During the Suharto era, the RMS movement in 1950, along with PRRI/Permesta in 1957–1958, DI/TII Kahar Muzakar and Kartosoeurijo in 1952–1965, PKI Madiun in 1948 and G30S/PKI in 1965, were categorised as very dangerous reactionary or separatist movements that had threatened the unity and unification of Indonesia as a nation-state; yet, they were not regarded as dangerous as communism (G30S/PKI). This was mentioned in history books used from elementary school upwards. As a ninth grade student, an Indonesian teen would be able to name Dr Soemokil, a leader of RMS, as a bad guy, a provocateur, that had betrayed the country by proclaiming the South Maluku Republic in 1950.

During the Suharto period, many books of Maluku history were published by the Department of Education and Culture. Almost every two to four years, there was a new edition of the history book, which was, in fact, not new at all but was instead a repetition of the same storyline each time (Depdikbud, 1976, 1977, 1983; Pattikayhahutu [Depdikbud], 1978, 1980, 1982; Othereila et al. [Depdikbud], 1993). In most of these books, the history of Maluku always began with the glory and prosperity of Ternate and Tidore kingdoms in north part of Maluku islands. These places were described as the main producers of spices, which at that time were vital for the trade system. The common story described the coming of Islam in a peaceful way to Maluku islands, thus converting Malukus to Muslims. Later, the story would tell how the Portuguese with their violence came to colonise these islands and also converted the Malukus to Christians. And the contemporary history of Maluka would always include the existence of RMS, which almost always was paralleled with the group of Christian Ambonese who were loyal to the coloniser, the Netherlands, but unfaithful to Indonesia (Muslim Ambonese were described as against the idea of RMS) (Depdikbud, 1983: 110). In one of these books, RMS is labelled as “an armed demolition tactic of colonialism” (Depdikbud, 1977: 90). Just like in Sukarno’s narrative, Suharto’s too described the RMS conflict as one of the horrible incidents in the history of Indonesia and portrayed it as an example of unfaithfulness that was the fault of one ethnic group, the Malukus, Christian Ambonese in particular (Othereila et al., 1993).

By contemplating the nationalist meta-narratives that for decades were fed to the minds of Indonesians, we can imagine how awkward the position of Christian Ambonese was in this nation-state. Being someone who lived in Maluku, a periphery far from the centre of national development (Java), was already a difficult situation to endure without carrying a burden of guilt in national history. More than just carrying such a burden in the politics of “otherness” and “Javanisation” played by Suharto and partly by Sukarno too, Christian Ambonese who lived in Maluku suffered all the consequences for being the “others”. It was isolated and left undeveloped, and instead of a national development centre, Ambon became a military outpost in the construction of the elite Java Islam-centred nation-state.
When the turmoil broke out in early January 1999, the RMS-ness of Maluku, particularly Christians, suddenly appeared. Some elements in the governments kept raising the issue of RMS as an actor behind the conflict Forum Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM—Molucca Sovereignty Forum), which claimed to fight for Malukus’ freedom, brought out the ghost of RMS. Thus, RMS, again, was accused of being a dangerous separatist movement that tries to shatter the unity of Indonesia, just as it had been accused of doing so for decades.

With the official disbanding of the radical Islam militia, Laskar Jihad (LJ), and an official announcement of LJ’s evacuation from the Maluku, the RMS was left as the lone group that could be blamed for any turmoil that happens in Maluku. Before 25 April 2003, the day when around 200 flags of RMS/FKM were waved in celebration of the anniversary of FKM, the state sent army troops to the islands and even announced “Siaga 1” (highest alert) in Ambon (Detik, 2003; Tempo, 2003; Kompas, 2003a, 2003b), the capital of the Maluku. Again, the nationalists used the meta-narrative of RMS to justify military excursions into the outer islands to maintain the territorial bounds of the nation-state.

Laskar Jihad and its fusion of nationalist and global-Islamic meta-narratives

In the information age, with the coming of the Internet, connectivity to the global network for the Muslim society in Indonesia also means connectivity to global Islam. Through the flow of information and graphic representations brought by advanced technologies of information and communications, particularly the Internet, the Islamic societies in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and other countries become more real and closer than ever before. Meanwhile, the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East is also making a very significant impact on the Islamic society in Indonesia. As global radical Islamic fundamentalism was beginning to flourish, Indonesia was just stepping into a period of ongoing political and economical turmoil, thus providing a fertile ground for radical Islamic fundamentalism to grow. Inter-regional conflict and separatist movements in several places in Indonesia provided more space for radical fundamentalism to establish itself and reinforced the process of disintegration of political structures in Indonesia. As Islam fundamentalism in Sukarno’s and Suharto’s regimes had been marginalised in the political arena for decades, the downfall of Suharto provided an exceptional opportunity for Islamic fundamentalist communities to rise up and step in the political field.

Among the fundamentalist movements, the jihad movement perhaps is the most radical one. In Indonesia, the most prominent jihad group is Laskar Jihad (see Box 4). This section will not describe Laskar Jihad as an organisation in great detail nor discuss the people behind or funding it. But, it will instead show how the LJ through its media propaganda—tabloid, radio and particularly websites—fused the nationalist and global Islamic meta-narratives to reconstruct reality for society.
Box 4

Laskar Jihad (LJ)

Laskar Jihad (LJ) was established as the paramilitary wing of Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jammah (Communications Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah) founded in Solo, Indonesia, on 14 February 1998 by a Madurese-Hadrami Arab named Jafar Umar Thalib. The LJ itself was formed on 30 January 2000 in response to rising Muslim victims in the Maluku conflict and was introduced to the world in April 2000 when its members along with other groups of Muslims held a street demonstration in Jakarta calling for a Jihad, or Holy War, in the Maluku islands.

The LJ arranged for military training to be given to volunteers at a camp in Bogor, near Jakarta. The LJ sent several thousand fighters to Maluku in the months after April 2000. The conclusion is unavoidable that the LJ received the backing of elements in the military and the police. It was obviously military officers who provided them with military training and neither the military nor the police made any serious effort to carry out the President’s order preventing them from going to Maluka.

LJ claims a three-part mission—social work, Muslim education and a “security mission”—and it has had over 10,000 members, some of whom have been active in eastern Indonesia in communal violence. Laskar Jihad has gained support from Indonesia’s armed forces (TNI) and has also been able to embezzle money from the military (over US$9 million). Its founder claims to have rejected approaches from Al-Qaeda but LJ supported the September 11 attacks on the US. In mid October, three days after the Bali bombing, Laskar Jihad announced that it had been disbanded (ICG, 2002a).

Laskar Jihad and the new media and communication technology

No other Indonesian mass organisation is as advanced as Laskar Jihad in using new media and communication technology. Since the beginning, LJ had used fax machines and computers to organise and develop its organisation as well as to disseminate information (Lim, 2005b). Later, it included the Internet as a main tool to coordinate its operations, disseminate information and also to recruit members and do fund-raising in addition to its traditional ways. LJ still uses printed media—Maluku Today bulletin, Salafy monthly, Laskar Jihad bulletin, and some books published by FKA/WJ or other publishers—to spread information regarding its ideology and activities, and still very much depends on face-to-face communications (Lim, 2005b). By holding rallies all over the country,
LJ persuaded thousands of students and youths to become troopers (members). There were also thousands of LJ sympathisers (volunteers) who distribute bulletin copies and collect donations at traffic lights (Lim, 2002, 2005a, 2005b). The well-combined uses of new and traditional media and communications contravenes the assumption that radical groups mostly consist of low-educated people. This also shows that LJ has got enough funding to communicate, disseminate and recruit on a large scale.\(^5\)

While FKA WJ has two websites, www.salafi.net (now salafi.cjb.com) and www.salafi.org, LJ had the Laskar Jihad Online (LJO, www.laskarjihad.or.id), which was launched in June 2000 and officially shut down by 15 October 2002. The website was subsequently the major vehicle to maintain and develop the group’s presence. Well-designed, bilingual and regularly updated, the LJO shows how LJ, while being ultra-conservative in its ideology, is ultra-modern in using technologies and is very much aware of the role of media (Lim, 2005b). In fact, the architect of LJ himself, Ayip Syarifuddin, mentioned that his (LJ’s) weapons are the sword and the pen (Hidayatullah, 2002). Besides the website, LJ also had more than 1,400 members\(^6\) on its Internet mailing list, which keep the members, who were scattered in 53 branch offices all over Indonesia, updated with its latest news. This was not just another religious radical fundamentalist group; this was Laskar Jihad, a group supported by computer-savvy youths using Web skills for recruitment, funding and information dissemination.

**Jewish (Zionist) conspiracy: Global jihad meta-narrative**

When the turmoil broke in Ambon on 19 January 1999, some flags of RMS were waving in several places including on the peak of Nora Mountain. However, the Kapolda (Chair of provincial police headquarter) and the churches denied it. They stated that RMS no longer existed. The flags of RMS were regarded as non-existence [sic] while they were appeared to many witnesses. In Holland itself, RMS is still active. The leaders are active and well-networked youth. Besides the flag of RMS, in those days there was a plywood signboard in front of seaport, which pronounced, “This is Israel’s territory” and in other place said, “I love you Israel!” (Isnet, 1999, translated from Indonesian).

The passage above, which claims to be a direct report from the field, was in an email message posted on an Islamic website in 1999. Reading the quotation, logically, we cannot find the common sense of relationship between the first and the second paragraph. It is obvious that there is a missing sentence or paragraph linking the first and the second; without it, we cannot find any correlation between the raising of RMS flags—which was denied by the government and the Christian side—and the homage to Israel. Why should it be “I love Israel”? Why
their belief that this book consists of secret plans of a Jewish organisation to rule and dominate the world through capitalism, communism, democratisation, authoritarianism, revolution and economic liberation all rolled into one (Bruinessen, 1993). They do not realise that this book is not a historical document at all but a fabrication written by several anti-Jews Russians, German Nazis and Hitler also used this book to legitimate the genocide of Jews (Bruinessen, 1993).

This meta-narrative of one and a half millennia of history was spread from the Middle East to Indonesia in the 1980s but has only become a hot issue among Indonesian Muslims since the end of Suharto’s regime. For the global jihad movement and today’s Indonesian jihadis, this conspiracy theory has become a non-negotiable truth to justify violence against non-Muslims and Christians. In Saudi Arabia, this meta-narrative is actively cultivated. It is taught in schools as a guide for Saudi Arabian youth in “dealing with the world” (see Box 5).

**Box 5**

**Global jihad meta-narrative**

There is no doubt that the Muslims’ power irritates the infidels and spreads envy in the hearts of the enemies of Islam—Christians, Jews and others—so they plot against them, gather (their) force against them, harass them and seize every opportunity in order to eliminate the Muslims. Examples of this enmity are innumerable, beginning with the plot of the Jews against the Messenger and the Muslims at the first appearance of the light of Islam and ending with what is happening to Muslims today—a malicious Crusader-Jewish alliance striving to eliminate Islam from all the continents. Those massacres that were directed against the Muslim people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims of Burma and the Philippines, and in Africa, are the greatest proof of the malice and hatred harbored by the enemies of Islam to this religion (Geography of the Muslim World, Grade 8, 1994: 32, cited in CMIP, 2002).

Since the appearance of Islam the enemies of this religion inside the Muslim world and outside it have been working to weaken Islam and the Muslims. In the Middle Ages our Islamic nation faced the destruction of the Crusaders, the Mongols, the Zoroastrians and other pagan nations. In the present era there is no (aggression) against our nation more serious and more wicked than the aggression of imperialism and its protégé—Zionism.

– Biography of the Prophet and History of the Muslim State, Grade 10, 2001: 73, cited in CMIP, 2002
Moreover, to strengthen this justification, the radical fundamentalist Islamic leaders also keep referring to a very selective group of verses from the Qur'an that seemingly legitimises violent jihad action:

Never will the Jews nor the Christians be pleased with you (O Muhammad Peace be upon him) till you follow their religion (Al-Baqarah: 120, also quoted in Geography, Grade 6, 1999: 43 cited in CMIP, 2002).
And fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits. Truly, Allah likes not the transgressors (Al-Baqarah: 190).

Al-Baqarah: 120 is the most cited verse used by jihadi Islamic websites to justify their conspiracy theory. And, based on this verse, these Islamic websites point out the conflicts in Palestine, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Maluku, Ambon, Poso, and other places in the world as proof of that verse. As an extension of this proof, the other verse, Al-Baqarah: 190, is used to justify jihad action in the form of physical violence.

Laskar Jihad’s meta-narratives
Laskar Jihad is not an exception. The official website of LJO—Laskar Jihad Online—put these citations of the Qur'an in each of its daily updated news page. The website itself offered all kinds of information—about the LJ, its leader and the debate behind the movement including news from the battlefield in the Maluku—in textual, visual, and audio forms. The visual and audio representations are meant to support the textual debate.

Box 6
Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah
Pioneering the struggle against the international Crusader-Zionist in Indonesia

The Islamic society in Indonesia is now being targeted by the conspiracy of international crusaders-Zionists and Islam has been regarded as a threat to the hegemony of crusaders-Zionists in Indonesia and its surroundings. Therefore, various evil conspiracies are being directed to Indonesia because the majority of Indonesians are Islamic and Indonesia has the potential to become a super-power country against the supremacy of hegemonic international crusaders-Zionists (Thalib, 2001: 7, translated from Indonesian).

Mutilated bodies said to be of Muslims massacred by Christians, damaged mosques and graffiti on walls containing messages that insult Islam were shown to support the textual debate, which was full of heated rhetoric concerning resist-
ance to Christianity, Judaism and US globalisation. Real audio files available in these sites mostly contained the speeches of LJ and other radical leaders. These texts, sounds, and pictures seek not only to justify the movement but also to try to convince Muslims about the importance of jihad by provoking the readers through images and sounds. More than just trying to convince, the website also “called” the Muslims to join the jihad as fearlessly embodied in the frightening but convincing sentence, “Remember! Death is already fixed; it won’t be hastened by Jihad, and will not be delayed by not carrying out Jihad” (FKAWJ, 2001).

Concerning its jihad war in Maluku, the main argument of LJ was that the Maluku Protestant Church (Gereja Protestant Maluku, GPM), the RMS movement being supported by the Dutch and the “Christian-Nationalist” of Indonesian Democratic Party in Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan—PDI-P) together initiated the conflict. And this conflict, according to LJ, is a part of a Christianisation project going on throughout Indonesia, which in the end supports the Christians-Jews international project in destroying Islam worldwide (see Box 6). The LJ itself pointed out that the Maluku once were Islamic islands before Western colonisers forcefully converted them to Christianity, just as it mentioned in all the state’s history books. More than just appearing as an independent group, LJ claimed to represent Islam itself in carrying out a holy duty of purifying the Muslims in Indonesia, leading them back to the right path and to not be trapped by the trick and domination of the non-Muslims (Zionists-Crusaders, Jews, Christians, the United States), and this can only be fulfilled by the application of the Muslim law (Islamic sha’ria) throughout Indonesia.

Listen to me, the USA! Listen to me supporters of the World Church Council! Listen to me Zionists-Crusaders! Listen to me Jews and Christians, we, Muslims, invite the US troops to prove their power here in the Maluku. Let’s fight fervently. Let’s prove that for the umpteenth time Muslims cannot be subjugated by their over-exaggerated physical power. The second Afghan war will happen in the Maluku if you are determined to threaten us, hey Americans! Now, hey you Americans, you have suffered losses in various huge attacks in Afghanistan. Let us bravely meet in the battlefield (Thalib, 2002; aired by SPMM26 Radio on 1, 2 and 3 May 2002; cited in Munindo, 2000, translated from Indonesian).

LJ was fond of linking the Maluku conflict with the United States (FKAWJ, 2002). In fact, LJ used the word Jews, Christians, Crusaders, Zionists, and Americans as if all of those words represented one person or one group of people—one identity group.

LJ also equates Christian Malukus with RMS and even created a new term for RMS: Republik Maluku Serani (Republic of Christian Maluku), accusing all

When a Christian Ambonese doctor named Alex Manuputty announced the Maluku Sovereignty Forum (Front Kedaulatan Maluku, FKM) at the end of 2000 and mentioned its connection to the RMS movement in 1950s, the LJ thesis was self-fulfilled by the Christians (Brauechler), and since then, this became the legitimate reason for LJ to attack Christians.

With its stories from the battlefield supported by pictures of victims, LJ also tried to reconstruct Islam as the victim. While in the Maluku case, LJ claimed that the Christian side was supported by the government and military, LJ also kept trying to put this situation in the bigger picture of the Indonesian state, as always, marginalising Islam. This narrative thus asserts that the Christian minority stirs the state to victimise Muslims, just like all Christians are asserted to be doing all over the world (mentioning Bosnia and Palestine). The LJ also used the *fatwa* (authoritative treatises and jurisprudential issuances) from religious leaders, whom interestingly were not Indonesian Islamic leaders but Salafist leaders from Yemen, to justify the act of jihad in the Maluku.

In this context, the RMS issue—which is an unforgivable sin in the nationalist perspective—is added to the allegations of LJ in the debate in the Maluku conflict. The separatism issue is seen as an accurate target to attack Christians in Maluku. The connectivity of Maluku to the Dutch in the past also legitimates the Christianisation issue—the Dutch in the colonisation period were the pioneers of Christianisation with its “Gold Gospel Glory” project. The fusion of the nationalist and global jihad meta-narrative thus makes LJ’s argument stronger than either one alone. This creates a powerful synergy between nation-state ideology and religiosity. Just as LJ leader Thalib always says, “We do jihad for the country, nation-state, and God (Islam).” For some Muslims in Indonesia, this, of course, is an unbreakable thesis.

While the Laskar Jihad project itself, according to some political analysts, was only a domestic political project, which was aimed at defending Muslims from Christian militias the government seemed unable to contain and, in addition, also at driving President Abdurrahman Wahid from power (Hefner, 2003), its atmosphere, sensation and impact go beyond these purposes. The meta-narratives it created put all Indonesian Muslims in a dilemma. After all, in most of Indonesians’ minds, Muslims or not, RMS is always a negative factor in national integrity. And the concept of one *ummah*—of a Muslim belonging to the Muslim community worldwide and thus should be defending
any Muslim anywhere in the world who is hurt by a non-Muslim, together with the belief in a Jewish conspiracy—is part of the global jihad’s meta-narrative which makes it difficult for a Muslim to blame LJ for its exhortations to violently defend the nation and Islam in the Maluku. After all, for a moderate or even a liberal Muslim who does not necessarily support jihad, LJ’s action has a certain resonance in their religious and national identities. This has further inhibited a consistent voice of condemnation from rising within the broader Muslim population.

Beyond cyberspace: The jihad trait of media in Indonesia

Beyond LJ’s own website and printed media, its meta-narratives are disseminated rapidly through many other Islamic websites either linked and not linked to laskarjihad.or.id and also through newspapers, magazines, tabloids and books. The Webmaster of LJO was persistent enough to keep sending an announcement about LJO in many guest books and mailing lists. Almost all common website shortcuts related to Ambon are owned by the Islamic sides of the struggle, with the reaction of cyber Muslims towards the Maluku conflict being quite remarkable, especially if compared to cyber Christians.

Many other websites devoted to Muslims in Maluku and elsewhere in Indonesia with the hyperlink reference to LJO were also created. Existing Islamic websites also devote a section or page to the Maluku jihad as well. Personal Islamic websites also create hyperlinks to the LJO. In fact, the term jihad itself is transformed into the cyber jihad among Muslim youth who, in assuming that the world is dominated by Western-based media who are biased against Islam, feel that only the Internet can still be available for the Muslim struggle. Thus, Muslims can fight by creating as many Islamic (jihad) websites as possible.

Apart from their presence in cyberspace, Laskar Jihad Online also became the most cited source of news and information on the Maluku conflict in some print media. Being confined in the frame that Laskar Jihad created, images and discourse of these print media—Republika, Suara Hidayatu'llah, Media Dakwah, and Sahili, among others—framed the Maluku conflict to strengthen the meta-narratives of Laskar Jihad rather than provide a coherent account on what and how the conflict was actually happening.

Indeed, even before the appearance of Laskar Jihad Online, these Islamist media had embraced the Laskar Jihad’s ideology. As these media had existed before the launch of this jihad website, they had published narratives of the Zionist-Crusader conspiracy against Islam but made no explicit link between the jihad action and nationalism at the time. Jihad was formerly seen as a purely religious action to be done by Muslims for other Muslims in the name of God.
Since the launch of Laskar Jihad Online, the fusion of global jihad meta-narrative and nationalist meta-narrative from the Laskar Jihad were heavily reflected in these Islamist media. Furthermore, with the emergence of the Laskar Jihad Online, these media could bring reality to their readers with “stories from the battlefield”. Images and personal stories of Laskar Jihad fighters and supporters in Ambon and other areas in the Maluku islands brought the narratives to reality and, thus, were more convincing and influential.

The case of Republika shows a distinct influence of the Laskar Jihad Online. Before the launch of the website, Republika, unlike mainstream newspapers that were dependent on the military news office as their source, was highly dependent on their field reporters, who were not many in numbers. Republika, thus, did not publish many articles as it seems not to have enough stories to publish. Also, while biased towards Muslims, this newspaper still tried to be uncontroversial and to show balanced views. However, with the emergence of the website of Laskar Jihad, Republika became very productive in publishing news of Maluku. This newspaper had become very dependent on the Laskar Jihad website and even used it as the main source of information on the conflict. As a result, Republika ended up publishing highly biased reports which reflected the views and ideology of Laskar jihad.

Books about the Maluku conflict that are published by Islamic writers/organisations between 2000 to 2002 also refer very much to LJO. More than just influencing books for Islamic adults, the jihad concept, while not directly related to LJ or based on LJO, also became the main themes in many Islamic books for children. Comic books with heroic stories of holy wars and laskars who fight the enemy in the name of Allah and showing pictures of a hero with a sabre in his/her hand, filled the racks of children’s sections of bookstores in major cities, including Jakarta. Indeed, Laskar Jihad has shown how the Internet, advanced media and communication tools and cyber networks can be effectively used to cultivate the Islamic society with its meta-narratives of absolute truths. By fusing the nationalist and global jihad meta-narrative, Laskar Jihad successfully gained popularity, power and even tacit legitimisation from the state and society. In fact, Vice President Hamzah Haz openly articulated his support of LJ and even opened the first National Congress of FKAWJ in May 2002 (Tempo, 2002).

**RMS and the Maluku conflict in Christian meta-narratives**

Contrary to the LJ view of hegemonic Christian-Zionism, there is more than a single story from the Christian sides about the issue of RMS in the history of Maluku and the recent Maluku conflict. However, from some printed sources, mainly books and magazines and electronic Internet-based materials, a quasi-
Example of the sentiments of Christians

Malukus have always been loyal to the Republic of Indonesia, this was proved by Maluku’s participation as one of the first eight states that built Indonesia in [sic] 17 August 1945 and also by Maluka’s participation in the struggles for independence, which was obvious in the Pattimura War of 1817 and Jong Ambon’s participation in Sumpah Pemuda of 1928.

However, after being colonised by the Dutch and Portuguese, joining the Republic of Indonesia does not result in a better situation for Malukus. Malukus have always been marginalised. In fact, after 50 years of being “independent” under Indonesia, Maluka is still one of five poorest provinces in Indonesia. During the New Order Suharto era, the Malukus did not get any chance to participate in political activities. And during this period, there had been a rapid homogenisation (Islamisation) program, the purpose of which is to eliminate the multi-cultural and multi-religion aspects in the Maluku.

The Maluku conflict, which first broke out on 19 January 1999, is the result of an elite conspiracy with power motives that took advantage of the heterogeneity of Maluku society. The conflict itself uses religious symbols but was not caused by the religious differences or the unfairness found in the society. While the differences and unfairness can be understood as a seed for conflict, that seed would never become a conflict and collective action of violence if it were not being politicised by the elite conspiracy.

It should be admitted that the people, public figures, and religious leaders in the Maluku have failed to solve the conflict. However, the most ironic is the failure of the state, both of government and the military. The state, obviously, is very irresponsible and disappointing (SAGU, 1999).

The main argument found in the Christian media, including ABO, Masariku and CCDA, is similar (see Box 7). Unlike LI, which points to Christians, Jews and the United States as the source of conflict, the Christian side generally avoids talking about religion. As a reaction to LI’s accusation that Christians started the conflict, Christian groups deny this charge but do not really accuse Islam of being the cause of conflict. The Christians mostly accuse the government, especially Suharto’s and Habibie’s regimes, of being the cause of the conflict. The Islamisation policies which were inscribed in the massive transmigration policy of the central government with increased spontaneous migration also bringing a lot of outside Muslims into the Maluku and which undermined the former religious
balance in Maluku is seen as one of the major contributing causes. The Christians also tend to point out provocateurs from outside of the Maluku and sent out by political elites in Jakarta as actors behind the conflict. The Christians also accuse Laskar Jihad of intentionally exacerbating the conflict. While not directly accusing Laskar Jihad as a first cause of conflict by not clearly mentioning that Laskar Jihad did not actually start the conflict, the Christian side implied it. Many websites kept putting Laskar Jihad on the spot mainly to gain sympathy from “the West”. By providing information in English, it is clear that Christian websites are meant to reach international audiences.

In view of the dark history of RMS, the Christians try very hard to deny the parallel between RMS and Christianity. Rather than try to exonerate RMS in the Java-centred nationalist history, the Christians try to emphasise that RMS was a political movement that was separate from religion. As proof of this position, the Christians point out that a number of ministers of the 1950 RMS were Muslims. Several websites try to support this argument by showing pictures of RMS proclamation in 1950. In these pictures, RMS is described as a movement that also included Muslims and Christians. The Lopa-Lopa channel put one picture showing RMS supporters wearing sarong, which mostly only Muslims would wear. ABO shows one picture of RMS banner with the words that implies Muslims’ support towards RMS.

The minor voice of the Christian side, which is based on a Western version of the RMS 1950 event and includes some concepts of separatism and self-determination (for example, Parker, 1996), points out that, after all, blaming all of the conflict on RMS would just reveals the “dirt” of the Indonesian government when it attacked Malaku while RMS was legally proclaimed as a legitimate organisation. In its totality, this view strongly suggests that the Indonesian state had constructed a false history. As such, it assails the meta-narrative of Indonesian nationalism.

Conclusion

Throughout history, people have created and used meta-narratives as a means to ascend over other identities and centres of power. This invariably results in claiming superiority over other cultures and peoples who are relegated to an inferior and even evil or villain status. To name just a few, examples of meta-narratives include Christianity, Islamism, Marxism, capitalism, democracy and communism.

While instrumental in claiming and expanding spheres of influence, meta-narratives soon encounter their own limitations. Among the more important limitations is the assertion of and claim to possess a unified truth, which is falsified or not able to be perceived by outsiders. In this regard, meta-narratives are similarly very much based on the idea of a centre, an origin, an ideal form, a fixed point, an essence, a God, a presence. These, in turn, create single histo-
ries that are hermetically sealed from outside criticism or alternative historical analysis.

The problem with centres, according to Derrida (1992), is that they attempt to exclude. In doing so, they ignore, repress or marginalise outsiders who become the other. For the nationalist, the RMS separatist movement is the other. For the jihad movement, RMS, Christians and all who do not support the Islamic-sharia are the others. Christians in Maluku also do not want to be in the periphery; they want to be in the centre as well. Thus, the notion of Derridean rupture or “de-centring”, where “in the absence of a centre of origin, everything became discourse” or a system in which pure meaning “is never absolutely present outside a system of differences” or a system which inherently has no centre, only a “series of substitutions of centre for centre” (Derrida, 1992: 1117–1118), becomes important here. Indeed, the need for de-centring is urgent especially in the context of ethnocentrism and religio-centrism. In the case of ethnic-based or religious-based conflicts like in Maluku, all parties should realise that every attempt to articulate the truth is only an imperfect articulation of many realities and is in need of constant openness to revision and reformulation. There is no centre, but all are and are not centres. Thus, no religion or ideology should be bigger and more powerful than others. This does not mean that the religions or nationalism should be undermined. But, the “will to power” (Nietzsche, 1887, 1901) should be less emphasised, if not eliminated. Thus, it is clear that in an archipelago as rich and diverse in religion, culture and history as Indonesia, none of the homogenising, hegemonic and ultimately exclusive meta-narratives of Islamic sharia, Christianisation or a javanisation project can claim to occupy “the centre” of this territorially bounded national society.

When correlating this notion of de-centring to the Internet, cyberspace actually has a huge potential for a de-centring processes. It can be a centre-less space with multi-centres—unlimited centres altogether—a social space where no single ideology can actually be dominant or become a centre as anybody has his/her own individual power to find his/her own centre or to de-centralise the centre. Thus, in the case of conflict, rather than contributing to its escalation, cyberspace can actually help to resolve it. To do so, it should be filled with as many as possible reading materials and stories that offer alternative perspectives. Such a wealth of information would offer a virtual forum for discourse among different versions of lived histories and collective memories rather than simply reify the meta-narrative to a centre.

Echoing Derrida’s argument again, “there is no such thing as truth in itself, but only a surplus of it ... truth is plural” (Derrida in Rosenau 1992: 97), truth should not be un-negotiated; it should be negotiable—at least to the point of mutual tolerance of different versions of truth. A meta-narrative of nationalism,
theism or even secularism that asserts a single truth ultimately cannot compel all to follow it, and at some point, its enforcement tends toward oppression, marginalisation and violence. Truth is finally only a result of interpretation, and interpretation itself is not a truth (Foucault, 1981).

In the jihad meta-narratives, as well as in Christian concept of martyrdom, we can see a kind of addiction to the “one truth”. It becomes so dangerous that people can be totally infused by such meta-narrative of truth. One is willing to kill and die just because of the will to exalt an unassailable truth, then “go for martyrdom is the most beautiful way to die?” Nietzsche (1886) describes the “will to truth” as man’s desire to find answers. Foucault (1981), with Nietzscheism as groundwork, demonstrates that the will to truth is not dissociable from the “will to power” (Nietzsche, 1887, 1901), a system of domination through exclusion. Truth, determined by man’s will to truth, is a construct of power. Here, we also need to notice that attacking the meta-narrative of truth by another meta-narrative of truth, no matter how high the liberation inscribed in the later meta-narrative, would just create an illogical gulf of overwhelming truth, like in the case of attacking jihad by the so-called ideology named democracy. While democracy itself is a good concept, making it big in its meta-narrative by boxing the other meta-narrative into a corner, would just cultivate this later meta-narrative to even become a grander narrative. Rather than killing this jihadi narrative of truth, it is better to cultivate the field for alternatives to it, which in the case of Indonesian Islamic society is to grow and feed the more inclusive Islam that is muted these days.

In the atmosphere of political reform, the Internet and other media actually now have freedom to provide space to alternative voices. The Internet, in particular, provides space for pluralism, just as it provides space for Christians, Muslims and even jihadis in the Maluku conflict. However, the pluralism here is very much a false state of affairs. Rather than nurturing the heterogeneity of a multicultural and multi-religious Indonesia, the Internet and other media have just become a transponder to import the global meta-narratives or to nourish the old inherited meta-narrative. The Internet, for Indonesians, should be used as a space where many voices can challenge existing meta-narratives, not to attack or be against them but to seek room for non-violent co-existence. The Internet should be the space for various narratives to speak by themselves and to speak to each other. All of these duties and responsibility are now in the hands of the state and civil societies, particularly the media, in Indonesia.

Notes
1. Regarding the nationalist meta-narratives, the author could not do content analysis of texts from the Internet since Internet technology itself has only been available to Indonesians from the mid 1990s.
2. Unlike Christian Chinese or Christian Javanese who are not so open in showing their identity, along with Manadonese, Papuan and Timorese, Christian Ambonese are mostly brave or not ashamed to reveal their being Christian by either showing the symbol of Christianity (for example, a cross medallion) or inserting Christianised words (for example, Puji Tulan – Praise the Lord, Hallelujah) in daily conversations. Many of the most prominent pop-singers in Indonesia are Ambonese, and they visibly show their Christian identity (for example, Bob Tutupoli, Ruth Sahanaya, Harvey Malaiholo, Glenn Fredly and Andre Hehanusa).

3. The original term used is “perbuatan anasir-anasir reaksioner Belanda”.

4. The major history books for third grade junior high school (or ninth grade) in the 1975 to 1994 curricula, clearly mentioned RMS as one of the most important separatist movements in the history of the Indonesian Republic. The relatively significant change in the interpretation of RMS happened after the 1998 political reform when many stories (especially about separatism and rebellion movements) in school history books were revised. In the last history book, those events are described as events themselves without any tendency to inscribe any super-negative judgment. Until early 2003, all elementary schools and junior high schools in Indonesia should only use the books that were approved by the government under the Department of Education and Culture (now the Department of National Education) for major resources for teaching. In early 2003, the Department of National Education endorsed the rule that allows schools to choose the books by themselves.

5. The history book published by the Department of Education and Culture after the 1998 political reform tried to revise history by saying that while North Maluku (Ternate, Tidore, and the surrounding land) were converted to Islam, the rest of islands in South Maluku (Uliase, Buru, Seram, and Ambon) were never converted to Islam but directly converted to Christianity from the original ancient belief of animism (Depdikbud, 1999).

6. The original term used is “satu taktik pengacauan bersenjata dari kolonialisme”.

7. Heryanto (1998) indicates that Suharto’s new order established its existence based on the exclusion of four major “others” which included communism, Islamic fundamentalism, the West and the ethnic Chinese. He argues that Suharto’s new order did not simply annihilate the “others”. Moreover, the regime rapidly, systematically and continuously provoked society by disclosing “evil” elements of these “others”.

8. The word jihad means striving; in its primary sense, it is an inner thing, within self, to rid it of debased actions or inclinations, and exercise constancy and perseverance in achieving a higher moral standard. In this chapter, it is used to speak to a form of Islamic fundamentalist opposition to modernity which mostly is translated as a physical war against the “unfaithful”.


10. Thalib claimed that LIJ consisted of about 40,000 members and several hundred thousand supporters.
23. The observation of Republikat’s reporting news on the Maluku conflict before the launch of the Laskar Jihad Online is based on an unpublished master thesis written by Buni Yani (2002).


25. This does not mean Laskar Jihad was successful in mobilising people using the Internet. Further in-depth research on this issue (Lim, 2005a, 2005b) shows that despite rhetorical widespread support, Laskar Jihad’s propaganda through the Internet and other related media was not persuasive enough to make people go for physical jihad in the form of war.

26. This final url is www.geocities.com/batu_capeu/index.htm. However, it also uses go.to/ambon and www.geocities.com/arumbaikole/index.htm which are redirected to the final url.

27. Unlike Islamic websites in the Maluku, the Christian websites can be identified easily partly because they are not too many in numbers. They include Djangan Lupa Maluku (www.dlm.org), Maluku Berdarah, Lopa-Lopa channel (www.geocities.com/chosye/), Maluku News Portal PosKo Zwolle-Maluku (www.malra.org), Maluku Web Portal (www.maluku.org). The Christian side also did not produce many books on the Maluku conflict. The author found only one book that is “obviously” published by the Christian organisation (Abel and Pattiradjawane, 2000).

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